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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
I have previously argued that courts should consider the time, place, and 
manner of police intrusions onto the curtilage of private residences, including the 
common areas of hotels and apartment buildings, when determining whether the 
police have infringed upon residents’ reasonable expectations of privacy and, 
therefore, performed a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.1  That 
proposal was intended to address, among other issues, the widespread practice of 
suspicionless “knock and talk” investigations not currently regulated by the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.2  I have also previously proposed a Fourth 
Amendment framework to reign in warrantless bulk data collection and its use in 
criminal investigations,3 suggesting that the distinction the Court first articulated in 
Smith v. Maryland4 between the “contents” of telephone conversations (and other 
                                                                                                                            
 
*    Associate Professor & Dean’s Distinguished Faculty Fellow, University of Oregon School 
of Law. 
1   Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to 
Urban and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 297, 319 (2005), reprinted in THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT: SEARCHES AND SEIZURES: ITS CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND THE CONTEMPORARY 
DEBATE (Cynthia Lee ed., 2011) [hereinafter Leonetti, Curtilage] (advocating the consideration of the 
time, place, and manner of entry, in the context of urban and suburban dwellings, in the 
determination of whether the area surrounding a small, single family home or individual unit in a 
multi-occupant dwelling is protected by the Fourth Amendment). 
2   See id. at 311–12 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s epistemological reliance upon a 
suburban conceptual framework had encouraged the proliferation of canine sniffs and knock and talks 
in urban neighborhoods). 
3   See Carrie Leonetti, Bigfoot: Data Mining, the Digital Footprint, and the 
Constitutionalization of Inconvenience, 15 J. HIGH TECH. L. 260 (2015) [hereinafter Leonetti, Data 
Mining] (positing that the sheer volume of information that the Government can collect (in the 
absence of individualized suspicion and the sophisticated algorithms that it uses to aggregate and 
analyze it) raises independent privacy concerns that themselves should trigger the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
4   Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (permitting the warrantless collection of Smith’s 
telephone-usage details because it did not involve surveillance of the contents of his phone calls and 
he knowingly revealed the usage metadata to the phone company for billing purposes). 
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electronic data compilations) and their “metadata” loses its meaning in the context 
of the pattern analyses of large amounts of aggregated third-party data.5  These 
earlier proposals, however, focus on context-specific questions: whether the 
private approach to a residence is the equivalent of a public sidewalk out in front 
of it, or whether a consumer’s voluntary revelation of individual digital 
transactions to private third parties (credit-card companies, toll collectors, etc.) 
eviscerates any reasonable expectation of privacy that such individual may have in 
the mosaic derived from all of his/her digital data in the aggregate. 
These earlier individual proposals share a broader, common theme, which is 
the subject of this Article: a desire to create a framework for constitutional 
protection against “dragnet” searches, i.e., large-scale investigatory sweeps that 
often are justified, at least in theory, as “consensual encounters” with the police, 
which the Court’s current jurisprudence suggests are not “searches” for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  Traditionally, these dragnet investigations 
exist either outside of the framework that Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in 
Katz v. United States6 set forth for searches (because courts find that they do not 
intrude upon areas in which individuals have an objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy) or within some exception to the Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment, like the plain-view or consent doctrines.7  This Article addresses this 
entire category of cases, proposing that a dragnet sweep conducted for the purpose 
of criminal investigation is, and should be, constitutionally different than a random 
consensual encounter between the police and a citizen begun for some other 
purpose.  The thesis of the Article is that courts should follow the Supreme Court’s 
lead in the recent case of Florida v. Jardines8 and take into consideration the 
investigatory motive of the police when they conduct large-scale dragnet searches, 
and find that such purpose may create a “search” in the same way that the Court 
has previously found in the context of the “special needs” doctrine that the lack of 
an investigatory motive on behalf of investigators can preclude one. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
5   See Leonetti, Data Mining, supra note 3, at 291–92. 
6   Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (holding that Katz had a constitutionally 
protected reasonable expectation of privacy in an enclosed telephone booth and that electronic 
intrusion into a protected area was a search under the Fourth Amendment, presumptively requiring a 
search warrant). 
7   See, e.g., In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring 
the Production of Tangible Things from [redacted], No. BR 13-109, at *7 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) 
[hereinafter “Declassified FISC Opinion”] (Amended Mem. Op.) (on file with author). 
8   Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
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II. SEARCH AS A BIMODAL INQUIRY 
 
Under Ybarra v. Illinois, 9  the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment has two components: a quantum component and an individualization 
component.  The police must have enough information (typically probable cause) 
to believe that a crime has occurred (the quantum of suspicion).10  When the search 
justified by that suspicion targets a particular individual(s), the necessary quantum 
of suspicion must focus on the searched individual(s) personally 
(individualization).11 
Historically, the Court has treated the quantum element of probable cause (or 
reasonable suspicion)12 for a particular search as a bright line: either the police 
have “enough” evidence to constitute probable cause (or reasonable suspicion), or 
they do not.  The Court has similarly treated the inquiry into whether a particular 
police investigatory practice invokes the protections of the Fourth Amendment in 
the first instance as a bright line: either an investigatory practice is intrusive 
enough (into a protected area)13 to be a “search,” or it is not.  After Katz, the 
boilerplate rule is (or is supposed to be) that if the police intrude into an area in 
which an individual lacks an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy, it does 
not matter whether they were conducting a criminal investigation when they did 
                                                                                                                            
 
9   Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (holding that a search warrant, issued upon probable 
cause, giving police officers the authority to search the premises of a small public tavern and the 
bartender for narcotics did not justify the pat-down search and seizure from a tavern patron in the 
absence of a reasonable belief that the patron was involved in any criminal activity or armed or 
dangerous). 
10  See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (defining the quantum of proof necessary to 
constitute probable cause as “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found 
in a particular place.”). 
11  See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91.  But see Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (holding that 
there was probable cause to suspect all three occupants of a moving vehicle individually of being in 
constructive possession of drugs and large quantities of cash found at different locations inside the 
vehicle, even in the absence of probable cause to believe that they were acting in concert); Samson v. 
California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006): 
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion.  
Thus, while this Court’s jurisprudence has often recognized that “to accommodate public 
and private interests some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to 
a constitutional search or seizure,” we have also recognized that the “Fourth Amendment 
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion.” 
(quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560, 561 (1976)). 
12  See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (holding that the police could stop individuals if 
they could point to specific and articulable facts that reasonably warrant the stop and could perform a 
reasonable search for weapons if they had reason to believe that the individual was armed and 
dangerous). 
13  In this context, “area” includes interests and activities and is not limited only to physical 
spaces.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects 
people, not places.”). 
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so.  No reasonable expectation of privacy means no “search,” and thus, no Fourth 
Amendment protection, irrelevant of the subjective intent that the investigators 
possessed when they initiated their intrusion.14 
These two bimodal inquiries (search/no search, sufficient cause/insufficient 
cause) combine to form a simple rule: a search requires probable cause (or 
whatever other quantum of suspicion is necessary to justify a particular 
investigatory practice); intrusions that fall short of being “searches” require no 
suspicion at all.15  In other words, the Court does not generally recognize a sliding 
scale, which imposes various degrees of suspicion relative to corresponding 
degrees of intrusion.16  As long as an investigative procedure is not a search as the 
Fourth Amendment defines that term, it does not matter how little suspicion the 
police have before engaging in it.  They can direct it at an individual at random or 
even for reasons that are arbitrary or unfair; they are not limited to directing it at 
                                                                                                                            
 
14  See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1858 (2011) (“If consent is freely given, it makes 
no difference that an officer may have approached the person with the hope or expectation of 
obtaining consent.”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that the constitutional 
reasonableness of traffic stops did not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers 
involved); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) (“The fact that an officer is interested in an 
item of evidence and fully expects to find it in the course of a search should not invalidate its seizure . 
. . .”). 
15  See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (holding that taking DNA for 
identification purposes was not a search); Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408–09 (2005) (holding 
that the canine sniff of a stopped vehicle was not a search); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 
(2000) (holding that squeezing a bus passenger’s duffel bag to determine its contents was a search); 
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 43 (1988) (holding that the removal and inspection of 
Greenwood’s garbage was not a search); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001) (holding 
that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the heat signature of Kyllo’s residential marijuana 
grow was a search); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (holding that the aerial 
surveillance of the backyard of Ciraolo’s home was not a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 706–07 (1983) (holding that the canine sniff of luggage at the airport was not a search). 
16  One exception to these general principles exists in the context of “special needs” searches, 
in which the Court usually engages in a balancing test, which weighs the intrusiveness of the search 
against the special need purporting to justify it.  See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) 
(upholding parole searches in the absence of probable cause); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 
U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (upholding a school district’s warrantless random urinalysis drug testing of 
student athletes because of the special, non-law-enforcement need to deter drug use in schools); 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (upholding warrantless drug and 
alcohol testing of train operators involved in accidents or safety violations); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325 (1985); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 294 (1984) (upholding an administrative 
inspection of fire-damaged premises); Camara v. Mun. Court of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 535–38 (1967) 
(upholding an administrative inspection of residential premises for housing code compliance).  As a 
doctrinal matter, in order to fit a search within the special-needs category, the police must lack an 
investigatory motive, at least as the primary reason for the search.  See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 
2074, 2081 (2011).  The arguably ironic result of this doctrine, in comparison to ordinary Fourth 
Amendment requirements of individualized suspicion and probable cause, is that special-needs 
searches are justified in part by the total lack of individualized suspicion with regard to a particular 
suspect. 
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suspects for whom they have some suspicion not rising to the level of probable 
cause or required to limit the intrusiveness of these non-search searches.17 
 
III. THE ROLE OF “INVESTIGATORY MOTIVES” (OR THE LACK THEREOF)  
IN THE SEARCH INQUIRY 
 
Despite sometimes breezy pronouncements to the effect that the investigatory 
motives of the police do not create a search, the Supreme Court has been consistent 
only in the inconsistency with which it has addressed the relevance of the motive 
of the police in determining whether a search has occurred for the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment.  This is partly because the subjective portion of the Katz 
inquiry focuses on the expectations of the suspect and the objective portion focuses 
on the normative desirability of the interest being invaded, but neither, at least 
formally, inquires into the state of mind of the police who conducted the 
investigation at issue.  This inconsistency has tended to be one-sided: when the 
police lack an investigatory motive for a particular intrusive practice, that absence 
often renders the practice not a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  
On the other hand, only when the police have an investigatory motive in 
conducting a particular intrusive practice does the Court tend to revert to Katz’s 
focus on the subjective expectations of the target of the practice (and whether those 
expectations are objectively reasonable).18  For example, in City of Ontario v. 
Quon,19 the Court issued its usual boilerplate proclamation that the presence or 
lack of a criminal investigatory motive by the police was irrelevant to the question 
of whether an investigatory practice was a search for the purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment,20 only to hold, under the specific facts and circumstances of the case, 
that a city police department’s warrantless review of one of its officer’s text 
messages on his department-issued cell phone was reasonable and did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment in part because the search was conducted for the purpose 
of reviewing the city’s contract with its wireless service provider rather than with 
investigatory motives.21  The Court has fairly consistently relied on this inquiry 
into law-enforcement motives in situations involving “special needs” searches, 
finding that the lack of an investigatory motive can remove a police intrusion into 
                                                                                                                            
 
17  See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 n.12 (1976). 
18  See, e.g., al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (holding that the Attorney General’s subjective intent in 
using the federal material-witness statute as a pretext to detain terrorism suspects against whom the 
evidence was insufficient to charge with crimes did not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the 
detentions were objectively reasonable); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
19  City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
20  See id. at 2627 (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613–14 
(1989)). 
21  See id. at 2632–33. 
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an otherwise constitutionally protected area out of the ordinary constraints of the 
Fourth Amendment (a warrant issued on the basis of probable cause). 
These two lines of doctrine (treating the sufficiency of suspicion as a bimodal 
enough/not-enough inquiry, and the suspect-based Katz inquiry, which makes the 
motive of the police irrelevant to the question of whether an area or activity is, or 
ought to be, constitutionally protected), working together, are what largely 
authorize (or at least fail to prohibit) “dragnet” investigative techniques—i.e., 
investigations in which the police lack a “suspect,” but instead profile large 
numbers of individuals in an attempt to locate one.  For the purpose of the probable 
cause/individualized suspicion dichotomy of this Article, “dragnet” searches are 
those in which the police typically have a great deal of general suspicion that a 
crime is afoot, but such suspicion is not yet individualized to a specific suspect or 
suspects.22  On the contrary, the purpose of the dragnet is to identify the suspect of 
a crime for whose existence the police already often have at least probable cause.  
For example, in a large-scale sweep of digital data to develop terrorism profiles, a 
DNA dragnet of a particular community, 23 or a knock-and-talk campaign in a 
“high-crime” neighborhood, the police know that there are terrorists, child 
molesters, and drug dealers committing crimes in the areas that are subject to 
investigation—they may even be investigating specific acts of terrorism, abuse, or 
drug distribution—but they do not know who the terrorists/molesters/dealers are.  
They only know generally where to look for them, based on established patterns of 
criminal behavior.24  Traditionally, as long as the dragnet is not a “search” under 
Katz, the fact that it is conducted without individualized suspicion against a 
particular target (or is even a fishing expedition, without any suspicion 
whatsoever) does not change its constitutional status.  The police are entitled to the 
                                                                                                                            
 
22  Cynthia Lee draws a similar distinction between what she terms the “programmatic 
purposes” of special-needs searches and “an individual officer’s purpose in engaging in a particular 
search.”  Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness with Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness 
Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1176 n.209 (2012). 
23  DNA dragnets do not fit neatly into the paradigm of the other dragnet searches 
contemplated by this Article because they tend to occur under circumstances involving more truly 
intelligent/knowing consent.  When agents collect electronic records or approach the door of an 
apartment from its private, interior entryway, they are relying on a more constructive post-Katz 
conception of consent—because the digital consumers or apartment dwellers knowingly exposed 
their data or front porch to third parties, they have relinquished any reasonable expectation of privacy 
in them.  In a typical DNA dragnet, on the other hand, officers approach targets under more Bostick-
type circumstances, asking targets specifically to consent to DNA collection and analysis.  See 
Amanda Ripley et al., The DNA Dragnet, TIME (Jan. 16, 2005), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1018083,00.html (describing DNA dragnets in 
which men were asked voluntarily to give their DNA without penalty for refusal).  See generally 
Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991) (holding that the Fourth Amendment permitted police to 
board a bus without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and obtain consent from passengers at 
random to search their luggage after advising them of their right to refuse consent to search). 
24  See Ripley et al., supra note 23. 
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benefit of a lucky guess or even a stab in the dark, as long as they do not cross 
Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy boundary. 
Courts have almost universally upheld warrantless police practices like the 
now longstanding “knock and talk” technique25 against constitutional challenges, 
even though they occur by definition without any individualized suspicion, 
because their conduct does not rise to the level of a “search” under Katz and, 
therefore, the Fourth Amendment does not restrict their use.26  The fact that these 
types of dragnet investigations are clearly motivated by a criminal investigatory 
purpose (i.e., the police are not collecting DNA to screen for genetic diseases to 
make treatment available to sufferers or knocking on hotel room doors to alert 
residences that the hotel is on fire) does not change the analysis under the Court’s 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  For people who have concern about the 
intrusiveness of these types of non-search searches, up until recently the Fourth 
Amendment offered little hope for their regulation.27 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
25  In a knock-and-knock investigation, the police target a particular building or neighborhood, 
typically one that they have identified as being high in crime generally or high in a particular type of 
crime under investigation (drug trafficking, prostitution, etc.).  They approach private dwellings 
(houses, apartments, hotel rooms) in that area and ask the residents to consent to a search of their 
residences.  See Leonetti, Curtilage, supra note 1, at 312  (describing the voluntariness concerns with 
“consent” in the context of knock-and-talk investigations).  Any evidence of a crime that the 
residence search turns up is admissible in a subsequent criminal proceeding, assuming that the 
individual who consented to the search had the apparent authority to do so, because the search was 
consensual.  See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2013) (holding that the police did not 
need a warrant or any quantum of suspicion to approach a home and knock because doing so was “no 
more than any private citizen might do”). 
26  Usually, these non-search searches rely on the “consent exception” to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.  In both cases, the police approach a target without “seizing” 
him/her, in the sense of the Fourth Amendment, and ask the target to consent to the procedure (giving 
a DNA sample or allowing police to search a residence).  The target can refuse; conversely, if the 
target agrees, s/he has “consented” to the search.  When courts find these dragnet procedures to be 
unconstitutional, they almost universally do so on the ground that the consent in the procedure at 
issue was not voluntary or that the initial consensual encounter had become so onerous as to 
constitute a seizure under Bostick based on the unique facts and circumstances of the case.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding Conner’s consent not to be voluntarily 
given when four police officers knocked on his motel room door, identified themselves as police, and 
demanded that he “open up”).  They do not find that the initial approach and request themselves are 
searches and therefore require a warrant and probable cause to perform.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the police use of knock-and-talk 
procedure to gain access to Cormier’s motel room was permissible and did not result in his seizure, 
vitiating his consent to the subsequent search of the room). 
27  See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 677 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“For 
most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been generally considered per se 
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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IV. REINVIGORATING THE ROLE OF POLICE MOTIVES  
IN THE SEARCH INQUIRY 
 
Two years ago, in Florida v. Jardines,28  the Supreme Court dramatically 
broke with its recent tradition of refusing to permit the investigatory motives of the 
police to create a search where none existed before, and for the first time (at least 
for the first time to the benefit, rather than the detriment, of the target of an 
investigatory practice) recognized the relationship between the intent of the police 
in conducting an investigation and the reasonableness of the expectations of the 
suspect under Katz.  In Jardines, the police responded to a tip that Jardines was 
growing marijuana in his home by bringing a trained drug-sniffing dog onto his 
porch to attempt to detect the odor of marijuana from inside the house.29  When the 
dog “alerted” to the presence of drugs inside Jardines’s home, the police obtained a 
search warrant for the premises, using the results of the warrantless dog sniff as a 
vital component of the probable cause for its issuance.30 
In reaching its holding that the dog-sniff at issue was a search for the purposes 
of the Fourth Amendment, the Court relied in part on the fact that the police were 
“gathering information” from within the curtilage of Jardines’s home, and it found 
that the typical social invitation extended by the front walkway (and the 
reasonableness of Jardines’s subjective expectation of privacy therein) was related 
to the intent of the visitor.31  The Court reasoned: 
 
An invitation to engage in canine forensic investigation assuredly does 
not inhere in the very act of hanging a knocker.  To find a visitor 
knocking on the door is routine (even if sometimes unwelcome); to spot 
that same visitor exploring the front path with a metal detector, or 
marching his bloodhound into the garden before saying hello and asking 
permission, would inspire most of us to—well, call the police.  The 
scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a 
particular area but also to a specific purpose.32  
 
The Court explained the relationship between the subjective intent of the 
police in conducting a particular investigation and the reasonableness of the 
suspect’s expectation of privacy in being free from such investigation as follows: 
“[W]hether the officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable search. . . . depends 
upon whether the officers had an implied license to enter the porch, which in turn 
                                                                                                                            
 
28  Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
29  Id. at 1413. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. at 1414–16. 
32  Id. at 1416 (footnote omitted). 
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depends upon the purpose for which they entered.”33  The Court concluded with 
the rather extraordinary statement that it “need not decide whether the officers’ 
investigation of Jardines’ home violated his expectation of privacy under Katz” 
because their physical intrusion “on Jardines’ property to gather evidence [wa]s 
enough to establish that a search occurred.”34 
 
V. REEXAMINING THE PLAIN-VIEW AND CONSTRUCTIVE-CONTEST DOCTRINES 
 
As the majority of the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized in its opinion, 
Jardines involved a physical trespass onto the curtilage of Jardines’s home. 35  
Nonetheless, the Court’s analysis of the relationship between an investigatory 
purpose on the part of police and the scope of the social invitation extended by the 
front porch of the residence has interesting ramifications for other types of 
intrusions, particularly in the context of the overlapping consent,36 plain-view,37 
and third-party doctrines. 38   Justice Sotomayor has recently called for a 
reexamination of the applicability of the plain-view and third-party doctrines in the 
context of high-tech surveillance in United States v. Jones, 39  but, rather than 
abrogating these doctrines, the majority’s reasoning in Jardines suggests a way 
that the plain-view and third-party doctrines could be modified to reign in dragnet 
searches without abandoning them in their entirety.  What follows are examples of 
how a modified search inquiry could work in several contexts that posed 
problematic applications of the Court’s traditional Katz framework. 
                                                                                                                            
 
33  Id. at 1417 (emphasis in original). 
34  Id.  The Court ultimately reached its conclusion on trespass, rather than expectation-of-
privacy grounds, but its finding of trespass (on a front walkway) was based on the motive of the drug 
investigators.  See id. 
35  See id. at 1414. 
36  See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (holding that the warrantless, 
consensual search of Bustamonte’s car during a traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because Bustamonte was not in custody at the time that he consented to the search and gave his 
consent voluntarily, even though the State offered no evidence that he did not realize that he could 
refuse). 
37  See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141–42 (1990) (holding that the police could seize 
evidence in plain view, without a warrant, provided that they were in a legal vantage point when they 
saw it); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 n.5 (1984) (upholding agents’ warrantless encounters 
with employees during an immigration raid in a factory as consensual because agents were legally in 
the factory to begin with). 
38  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967) (“What a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment 
protection.  But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be 
constitutionally protected.” (internal citations omitted)). 
39  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) 
(suggesting that “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”). 
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A. Online Social Networks  
 
Information posted on online social networks (OSNs) is a good example of 
the mismatch between the dragnet searches authorized by the plain-view and third-
party doctrines, particularly as articulated in Smith v. Maryland, and the realities of 
the online sharing of information among friends and families.  The rigid line 
between “private” and “shared” information that forms part of the central rationale 
of Smith does not make much sense in the context of a semi-private Facebook 
page.40   Under Katz, the reasonableness of a user’s expectation of privacy in 
his/her Facebook page would depend, at least in part, on how high s/he set the 
security features for the page.  A user whose Facebook page, in its entirety, is open 
to the general public likely has no reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents.  
This Article, however, is more concerned with users at the other end of the 
privacy-feature continuum, who set their privacy features so that the page is only 
accessible to a few friends and family members, or with users who believe that 
their Facebook pages are more private than they actually are because they do not 
understand the relationship between their friends’ privacy settings and third-party 
access to their own information.41  These individuals have revealed (or, in the case 
of the unsophisticated user, knowingly revealed) the contents of their pages to a 
limited group of third parties but have not made them available to the general 
public, in much the same way that telephone users make their usage details 
available to the telephone company but not the general public.  The term “semi-
private,” as it is used in this Article is intended to capture this idea of information 
accessible to some third parties but not the public generally. 
While it is hard to imagine that one would have an objectively reasonable (or 
even a subjective) expectation of privacy in an online blog, an OSN post, to which 
there is neither purely private nor purely public access, is a harder situation to 
dismiss solely on the ground that the post is in plain view from a legal vantage 
point by at least some individuals.  However, Jardines’s reasoning may point to a 
reasonable middle ground, if one analogizes a Facebook page to the front walk of a 
                                                                                                                            
 
40  Facebook can be either a problematic or an emblematic example of the fallacy of a rigid 
distinction between private and public, particularly one that is based on an assumption-of-risk theory, 
because its privacy settings are both complicated to operate, see Kristin Burnham, 10 Most 
Misunderstood Facebook Privacy Facts, INFO. WEEK (Nov. 21, 2013 9:06 AM), 
http://www.informationweek.com/10-most-misunderstood-facebook-privacy-facts/d/d-id/898873 
(describing Facebook’s complicated and constantly changing privacy features), and manipulable by a 
page’s owner, the result being that individual Facebook pages vary greatly in their level of 
privacy/publicity.  See NATASHA WHITEMAN, UNDOING ETHICS: RETHINKING PRACTICE IN ONLINE 
RESEARCH 59 (2012) (characterizing Facebook as “semi-public” because its contents are “freely 
accessible” but “constrained by personalised privacy settings which enable users to set their own 
levels of visibility and openness” and documenting concerns that Facebook users do not understand 
its privacy settings). 
41  See, e.g., MARTIN DOWDING, PRIVACY: DEFENDING AN ILLUSION 74 (2011) (explaining how 
Facebook’s default settings are public and increasingly difficult for users to set to private). 
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residence.  It is not a purely private space, in the sense that others are, in the case 
of Facebook, explicitly invited to enter, but that invitation is limited in scope.  
When a user posts on Facebook, Instagram, or Linked In, the post is intended as a 
social or business invitation, not an invitation to criminal investigation, in the same 
way that the front porch may beckon Girl Scouts selling cookies, mail carriers, or 
visiting neighbors, but not drug-sniffing police dogs. 
 
B. Data Mining 
 
A similar observation can be made more broadly about the data that 
consumers and other digital users reveal to third parties individually but do not 
intend to be combed through systematically in the course of a large-scale law 
enforcement investigation.42   A recently declassified opinion from the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court held that the bulk metadata collection in the NSA 
and FBI’s infamous “Prism” program did not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because it was “squarely controlled” by Smith.43  More recently, the New York 
Times has revealed that federal drug-enforcement agents have routinely been using 
subpoenas to access the bulk telephone records of Americans, a process of dragnet 
data collection whose “scale and longevity” is unmatched, even by Prism.44  I have 
previously suggested that the metadata/contents distinction first advanced in Smith 
is meaningless and outdated in a modern, high-tech information society, and that it 
should not be applied to large-scale data mining because the process of mining and 
aggregating the data itself reveals new information about private patterns of 
behavior.45   
The limited-consent doctrine of Jardines suggests another reason that Smith’s 
contents/metadata distinction, and in particular the Court’s blithe pronouncement 
that the revelation of such metadata to the phone company simply took its 
procurement out of the realm of searches under Katz, is overly simplistic in the 
                                                                                                                            
 
42  See, e.g., United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204–05 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Every federal 
court to address this issue has held that subscriber information provided to an internet provider is not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment's privacy expectation.”).  See also Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 
828, 842–47  (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that email address metadata was not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, under Smith); United States v. Forrester, 512 F.3d 500, 510–11 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding 
that the IP addresses that Forrester visited were not protected by the Fourth Amendment because he 
knowingly shared them with his internet service provider); United States v. Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 
1077–78 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that defendant Rojas’s credit-card statements were not protected by 
the Fourth Amendment because he knowingly shared the information contained in them with his 
bank). 
43  Declassified FISC Opinion, supra note 7, at 6. 
44  Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A.’s, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2013, at A1.  The drug-enforcement program, called “Hemisphere,” “covers 
every call that passes through an AT&T switch—not just those made by AT&T customers—and 
includes calls dating back 26 years . . . .”  Id. 
45  See Leonetti, Data Mining, supra note 3, at 292. 
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context of the larger scale mining of metadata and other semi-private information: 
the “consensual” revelation of individual bits of data to third parties by digital 
consumers is limited in scope by the purpose for which it is given (billing, 
provision of service, etc.), and that consent should not be construed as extending to 
collection during law enforcement investigations. 
 
C. Knock-and-Talks 
 
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the majority’s reasoning in Jardines is 
reconciling it with Kentucky v. King,46 which the Court decided only two terms 
earlier.  As Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Jardines pointed out,47 in King, 
discussing the plain-view doctrine, the Court explicitly rejected the suggestion that 
the investigatory motive of police officers observing incriminatory evidence in 
plain view would affect the initial question of whether the plain viewing occurred 
from a legal vantage point, proclaiming: “[I]t does not matter that the officer who 
makes the observation may have gone to the spot from which the evidence was 
seen with the hope of being able to view and seize the evidence.”48 
While the Court has never addressed the issue of dragnet knock-and-talk 
investigations, in King, it addressed the issue of a single, failed knock-and-talk 
approach to a private residence (failed in the sense that, rather than obtaining 
consent to enter and search the apartment, the knock triggered exigent 
circumstances that justified an entry without the consent of the occupants).  In 
King, the police followed a suspected drug trafficker away from a “buy and bust” 
transaction with an undercover officer into the hallway of an apartment complex, 
where they lost him in one of two apartments in a dead-end corridor.49  Since the 
police did not know which of the two apartments the suspect had disappeared into, 
they decided to knock on the door of one of the apartments from which they 
detected the smell of marijuana emanating.50  When the police knocked on the door 
and announced their presence, the occupants of the apartment responded by 
moving around the apartment without responding to the police at the door, which 
the Court ultimately blessed as exigent circumstances dispensing with the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.51  When the police entered the apartment, 
                                                                                                                            
 
46  131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
47  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1423 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Even when 
the objective of a ‘knock and talk’ is to obtain evidence that will lead to the homeowner’s arrest and 
prosecution, the license to approach still applies.  In other words, gathering evidence—even damning 
evidence—is a lawful activity that falls within the scope of the license to approach.”). 
48  King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858. 
49  Id. at 1854. 
50  See id. 
51  See id. at 1854, 1856. 
2016] MOTIVE AND SUSPICION 
 
 
259 
they discovered several occupants, including King, along with cocaine and 
marijuana.52 
While King ultimately involved the issue of whether the police could avail 
themselves of an exigency that their investigative choices played a role in creating, 
and involved an approach to an apartment for which the police already had at least 
some quantum of individualized suspicion (if not the requisite probable cause for a 
search warrant or warrantless entry), 53  the Court’s rationale for upholding the 
initial knock on the door of the apartment in which King was later arrested would, 
presumably, apply equally to dragnet knock-and-talk investigations, initiated on 
the basis of no individualized suspicion.  For example, the Court in King suggested 
that as long as the initial knock constituted a consensual encounter (i.e., a true 
knock, not the pounding of a battering ram), and as long as the police did not enter 
prior to the exigent circumstances arising, or demand entry, or threaten to break 
down the door if the occupants failed to open it voluntarily, the only search for the 
purposes of the Fourth Amendment is the one that occurs after the exigent 
circumstances have arisen.54  The Court categorically declared, “officers may seek 
consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the 
consensual encounter occurs.”55  It also declared: “When law enforcement officers 
who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any 
private citizen might do.”56 
There are two ways that one could reconcile King and Jardines.  The first is 
that King dealt with the plain-view doctrine while Jardines dealt with the plain-
smell doctrine, but this distinction seems meaningless from both normative and 
descriptive perspectives.  From a normative perspective, it is hard to imagine a 
reason why the “plain-sense” doctrines ought to distinguish among the different 
senses in resolving the doctrinal question of the role that an investigatory motive 
plays in the legality of the vantage point from which the senses of the police are 
first engaged.  From a descriptive or empirical perspective, the Court has suggested 
that the plain-view doctrine applies equally to other senses (plain smell, plain 
                                                                                                                            
 
52  See id. at 1854. 
53  See id. at 1857–58. 
54  See id. at 1863. 
55  Id. at 1858. 
56  Id. at 1862. 
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touch, etc.)57 and gave no indication in Jardines that it intended to abrogate or limit 
these other plain-sense doctrines.58 
The other possibility is that there is a meaningful constitutional distinction 
between a human and canine plain smell, but again, it is hard to imagine a 
normative rationale for that distinction as it bears on the question of whether the 
police may target a suspect in the first instance without a sufficient quantum of 
individualized suspicion, and the majority of the Supreme Court, in Jardines, 
seemed, as a descriptive matter, to reject that distinction in its rejection of the 
State’s proposed analogous distinction between the warrantless high-tech 
surveillance prohibited by Kyllo v. United States and the low-tech dog sniff at issue 
in the case: 
 
[W]e find irrelevant the State’s argument (echoed by the dissent) that 
forensic dogs have been commonly used by police for centuries.  This 
argument is apparently directed to our holding in Kyllo v. United States 
that surveillance of the home is a search where ‘the Government uses a 
device that is not in general public use’ to ‘explore details of the home 
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion.’  
But the implication of that statement (inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) 
is that when the government uses a physical intrusion to explore details 
of the home (including its curtilage), the antiquity of the tools that they 
bring along is irrelevant.59 
 
VI. SLIDING SCALES 
 
Other commentators have proposed sliding scales for the Fourth Amendment, 
although they tend to focus on the relationship between some combination of the 
severity of the offense of investigation, the intrusiveness of the government 
investigative technique at issue, and the quantum of suspicion necessary to initiate 
the investigation.  For example, Albert Alschuler has argued for a probable-cause 
standard that takes into consideration the “quantum of evidence” justifying a 
search, the “seriousness of the evil that a search or seizure might prevent,” and “the 
extent to which this search or seizure would intrude upon privacy, liberty or 
                                                                                                                            
 
57  See, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 
371 (1993) (holding that contraband detected through a warrantless “plain touch” during a pat-down 
search could be admitted in evidence).  See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) 
(upholding a search of a house based on warrant on agents smelling the odor of fermenting mash 
from the sidewalk in front of the house). 
58  See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1418 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Like . . . 
binoculars, a drug-detection dog is a specialized device for discovering objects not in plain view (or 
plain smell).”). 
59  Id. at 1417 (internal citations omitted). 
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property.”60  Craig Lerner has proposed a sliding scale of probable cause that takes 
into account the gravity of the investigated offense and the intrusiveness of the 
proposed search as part of the reasonableness framework. 61   Sherry Colb has 
similarly argued for a sliding scale that takes into consideration the seriousness of 
the offense under investigation and the severity of the governmental intrusion, with 
probable cause being sufficient for minor offenses but something more than 
probable cause being required for more serious governmental intrusions.62  Jeffrey 
Bellin has also proposed a sliding scale of required suspicion based on the severity 
of the crime of investigation.63 
The sliding scale proposed in this Article is a different one than those outlined 
in these other proposals.  It draws a distinction between suspicion that a crime has 
occurred and individualized suspicion (that a particular individual(s) has engaged 
in such criminal activity).  Rather than focusing on the level of government 
intrusion involved in a particular investigatory technique, it focuses on the 
existence and degree of individualized suspicion (as opposed to guilt by 
association), and reaches nearly the opposite conclusion of other scholars, 
proposing that the greater the suspicion of collective or non-individualized 
criminal activity, the more justification that should exist for the search of any given 
individual.  In other words, rather than proposing a sliding scale for the quantum of 
suspicion that police may have with regard to a particular individual (probable 
cause, reasonable suspicion, a mere hunch), I propose a sliding scale for the bulk 
nature of the suspicion: from individualized suspicion, as the Court described it in 
Ybarra v. Illinois; to a targeted search of multiple individuals, for the purpose of 
narrowing a short list of suspects; to a fishing expedition whose purpose is to 
identify suspects in the first instance.  Under my proposal, the dragnet would 
require more justification (in terms of reason to believe that a crime has occurred) 
than a more targeted search, in which there is at least some suspicion of the 
individual(s) being targeted. 
This proposal is essentially the inverse of the special-needs doctrine.  The 
balancing test of the special-needs doctrine has two primary components: (1) a lack 
of investigatory motive on behalf of the police; and (2) the involvement of areas of 
decreased reasonable expectations of privacy (schools, prisons, probation and 
parole, heavily regulated industries, public highways, airports and other borders), 
which combine to permit searches on less than the probable cause ordinarily 
                                                                                                                            
 
60  Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 
227, 249–50 (1984). 
61  See Craig S. Lerner, Reasonable Suspicion and Mere Hunches, 59 VAND. L. REV. 407, 417 
(2006). 
62  See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment “Reasonableness,” 
98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1673–77 (1998). 
63  See Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing 
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2011). 
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required by the Warrant Clause. 64   But what if these two components were 
reversed?  Dragnet searches involve the opposite scenario: (1) strong investigatory 
motivation and (2) areas of decreased (but not no) expectations of privacy (e.g., 
noncoding DNA regions, front doors of apartments and hotel rooms, digital data 
knowingly revealed in individual points to third parties for specific purposes, 
observable facial characteristics).  Dragnets, by their definition, also involve high 
percentages of actual innocence—the residents of “high-crime” neighborhoods 
who are not drug traffickers or Internet users who are not terrorists and who have, 
therefore, if anything, greater interest in their privacy.65  In the same way that the 
“special needs” contexts justify less-than-full protection of the Fourth Amendment, 
dragnet searches, with their strong (but not yet individualized) investigatory 
motive, justify more-than-none. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
It is more than time for the Supreme Court to determine, in a systematic way, 
the role that the motives of the police should play in determining whether a search 
has occurred for the purposes of Fourth Amendment protections.  As I have 
previously advocated, in another context: “If the lack of an investigatory motive . . 
. may be used to declare . . . an intrusion reasonable, it stands to reason that the 
presence of such an investigatory motive . . . would constitute a search for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.”66 
                                                                                                                            
 
64  See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1981–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the 
Court only permits special needs searches, without individualized suspicion, “when a governmental 
purpose aside from crime-solving is at stake”). 
65  Cf. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998) (holding that Carter had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in an apartment that he was in solely for the purpose of packaging cocaine); 
United States v. Caymen, 404 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that Caymen had no legitimate 
expectation of privacy in the contents of a computer hard drive that he obtained by fraud). 
66  Leonetti, Curtilage, supra note 1, at 309. 
